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Abstract

Identity technologies within Internet applications have evolved at an aggressive pace over
the past decade. As a result, a variety of user-centric identity management technologies are
available on the Internet today. The user-centric identity technology realm has become a
fragmented ecosystem of standards, techniques, and technical approaches to identity
management. A symptom of this fragmentation is the sluggish adoption of user-centric identity
technologies by Internet users. A study titled, An Analysis of User-Centric Identity Technology
Trends, OpenID’s First Act, aims to reveal identity technology adoption patterns of users that
engage in the use of Internet applications secured by an authentication credential. The study
specifically focuses on Internet applications currently offering, or having at some point in time
offered OpenID 1.x/2.0 (denoted OpenID hereafter), also known as OpenID’s First Act. An
extensive history of OpenID, from its inception as an emerging technology, to its declining rate
of adoption as a standard for Internet single-sign-on, will be presented. A goal of this critical
analysis is to reveal the shortcomings of OpenID that led to the discontinuation of the technology
by prominent Internet applications. In support of this critical analysis, a survey is conducted
which gauges the awareness of OpenID among casual Internet users. The results from this
survey will be compared with observed trends among Internet applications to determine the
contributing factors to OpenID’s decline on the Internet and the subsequent efforts to reinvent
the technology.
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Chapter 1 – Identity Technology Overview
With recent trends in identity related security threats on the Internet, users are being
urged to employ extra measures to safeguard authentication credentials. Similarly, a subset of
consumer-facing Internet applications in the United States have been mandated to implement
sophisticated identity management techniques to aid in the protection of users (Costanzo, 2006).
The rate in which user-centric identity technologies and techniques are adopted may largely
influence the viability of the Internet as a safe place for users to conduct business or carry out
social interaction (Cameron, 2005). Understanding the adoption of user-centric identity
technologies is a goal of this study. To better comprehend the adoption of such technologies, an
in-depth analysis of OpenID, and its adoption by Internet applications, will be performed to gain
insight into the lifecycle of user-centric identity technologies.
For much of the Internet’s history, it was sufficient to use rudimentary mechanisms, such
as username and password combination as an authentication credential to govern access to webbased applications. As the sophistication of malicious Internet users grows, new techniques are
required to ensure unauthorized access to Internet applications is made more challenging
(Cameron, 2005). To frame the study, a brief history of Internet-based identity will be presented
to demonstrate the sophistication necessary to protect access to Internet applications.

Internet Identity Technology History
The initial stages of the Internet had little need for the concept of identity and
authentication. As entities of higher value began to join the worldwide network of computers,
differentiating users of an Internet application was crucial to providing compelling features and
securing private information. Unfortunately, identity was not included in any of the fundamental
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protocol layers that comprise the Internet today (Cameron, 2005). Presently, username and
password based authentication remains the predominant mode of authenticating a user of an
Internet application. Steps have been taken to improve the sophistication of the username and
password credential type. However, the credential type remains vulnerable to attack and has
prompted computer security professions to seek more secure techniques for authenticating users
(Costanzo, 2006). Additionally, the ubiquity of the username and password credential type has
resulted in the phenomenon known as password fatigue. Password fatigue leads users to arrive at
weak credential sets making it easier to memorize several username and password combinations
for use at multiple Internet applications. This behavior ultimately reduces the security of the
credential, therefore exposing the user to greater risk of credential theft (Josang, Al Zomai, &
Suriadi, 2007).
OpenID entered the Internet application authentication landscape in 2005 (Fitzpatrick,
2005). This novel technology aims to reduce the number of username and password
combinations a user must maintain for gaining access to Internet application by introducing
many improvements to existing identity technologies, (Recordon & Reed, 2006).

Username and Password Authentication
The username and password credential type has been and remains the most ubiquitous
form of authentication in use on the Internet. As a credential type, there is nothing particularly
insecure about username and password. However, security issues arise around the proliferation
of this credential type across multiple Internet entities. For example, the average Internet user
maintains approximately twenty-five accounts across various Internet applications (Sun, Pospisil,
Muslukhov, Dindar, Hawkey, & Beznosov, 2011). In most cases, each Internet application
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requires a user to specify a set of credentials. When a user is faced with maintaining credentials
for a multitude of Internet applications, the likelihood of poor credential management increases.
Poor credential management manifests in many ways. When credentials are poorly managed, the
likelihood of having credentials compromised is far greater. A closer look at poor credential
management will help reveal ways that OpenID may strengthen the security of the username and
password credential type.
Username and Password Reuse
When a user engages in the use of multiple Internet applications, the likelihood that
username and password credentials will be reused is high. This convenient behavior allows a
user visiting an Internet application quicker access via reused credentials. Reusing credentials is
not an entirely poor practice if cryptographically strong passwords are being used. However, a
major shortcoming of this behavior is the lack of centralized credential management. Should a
reused credential become compromised, there is not an easy way for the user to change their
password at all necessary Internet applications. As a result, there is a period of time a malicious
user can use a compromised credential to access Internet applications. Additionally, the user is
burdened with the need to update credentials at each Internet application to ensure unauthorized
access will not continue.
While most OpenID implementations employ a username and password credential, the
specification does not explicitly state what sort of authentication should be used (OpenID
Authentication 2.0 - Final, 2007). Even when a username and password is in use via OpenID,
considerable protection is afforded by the centralized nature of the credential storage. If the
username and password credential of an OpenID account were compromised, the user could
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OpenID will no longer accept the compromised credentials.
Password Hygiene
It’s generally accepted that sharing beverage containers with others is considered poor
personal health hygiene, sharing credentials is akin to this risky behavior. To safeguard
username and password credentials, specifically the password portion, users are encouraged not
to share their password and to use cryptographically complex characters when devising
passwords. The behavior of sharing passwords is more common than one may think. For
example, Figure 1 shows a sample Internet application that encourages users to provider their email credentials so that contacts may be extracted for use in discovering fellow users.

Figure 1 - Example Internet application (http://linkedin.com) asking for email credentials.
Despite most Internet applications offering this feature state that credentials are not
stored, it is generally considered poor practice to share credentials with anyone, even what may
appear to be a trusted Internet application. This is considered poor practice because a malicious
entity may construct a rouge Internet application that requests third party credentials with
promise of a valuable service based on the obtained data. A naive user may be duped into
providing their credentials and not recognize that the Internet application is indeed malicious

4
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because of prior successful experiences with similar, but legitimate, Internet applications. Since
it is challenging to distinguish a legitimate Internet application from a malicious one, engaging in
credential sharing is not recommended. To facilitate a similar exchange of user information, an
extension to the OpenID protocol defines a mechanism for attribute data exchange between
Internet applications and identity providers (OpenID Attribute Exchange 1.0 - Final, 2007).
Password Vaulting
A common feature of popular web browsers is password vaulting. This feature offers
storage of credentials for subsequent visits to respective Internet applications. While this feature
seems reasonably secure, users expose themselves to significant risk by electing to vault
credentials via any means. As demonstrated in Figure 2, the insertion of this capability into the
interactions between a user and Internet application makes it a compelling alternative to more
complex forms of identity management.

Figure 2 - Example password management capability demonstrated via Firefox 5.x at
http://stackoverflow.com.

Federated Identity
The fundamentals underlying OpenID are not new to the identity management realm.
OpenID employs a federated identity use case that allows a user to authenticate in one domain
and assert their identity in another domain in a manner such that it is sufficient to satisfy the
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target Internet applications authentication requirement. The action of engaging in the use of
federated identity is called federated authentication or single sign-on. These same use cases are
facilitated via other federated identity technologies such as Security Assertion Markup Language
(SAML), WS-Federation, Shibboleth, and many other minor frameworks employing similar
paradigms. OpenID builds upon its predecessors with the introduction of dynamic trust between
identity providers and Internet applications via the establishment of associations (Recordon &
Reed, 2006). The established association allows for subsequent messaging between the identity
provider and Internet application with reduced overhead of renegotiating a shared secret. These
features distinguish OpenID from other static trust federated identity technologies that usually
require the exchange of cryptographic credentials via an out-of-band exchange.

Identity Provider
An identity provider is an entity on the Internet that challenges a user for some variant of
authentication credential in order to validate a claimed identity. For example, Google serves as
an identity provider by offering federated authentication via the OpenID protocol. As shown in
Figure 3, Google is often available as an identity provider for Internet applications supporting
federated authentication. In practice, Internet applications supporting OpenID tend to prefer
specific prominent identity providers (Sun, Pospisil, Muslukhov, Dindar, Hawkey, & Beznosov,
2011). Although there are various reasons for this preference, a primary motivation is the lack of
insight an Internet application has into the authentication event at the identity provider.
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Figure 3 - Example login component from http://stackoverflow.com featuring some OpenID
capable identity providers with identity provider specific icons and arbitrary OpenID identifier
specification
To foster the truly open nature of OpenID, an Internet application should permit a user to
specify their OpenID identifier. By specifying an OpenID identifier, the user is instructing the
Internet application which identity provider should be used to carry out the OpenID transaction.
Allowing the user to specify this critical piece of information to seed the authentication process
is a defining characteristic that makes OpenID user-centric (Crompton, 2010). The user controls
the initiation of the transaction and may even specify an identifier that leads the Internet
application to use an identity provider under the administration of the user. Supporting arbitrary
identity providers may be risky for Internet applications for the following reasons.
Weak Authentication
An integral piece of the authentication process is the event in which the identity provider
collects the credential that is provided by the user. The event may result in the presentation of a
username and password, the output of a cryptographic operation, a token, or any number of
uniquely identifying pieces of data. Federated identity protocols often include a means to
convey the type of credential used to authenticate a user. This valuable piece of data may be
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passed to the partner Internet application to ensure the user was sufficiently challenged to verify
their identity. For example, the SAML specification has been augmented with extensive
metadata capabilities to express the type of authentication credential presented by the user. In
order for interoperability to exist between federation partners, a set of Uniform Resource
Identifiers have been established via the Organization for the Advancement of Structured
Information Standards (OASIS) (Assertions and Protocols for the OASIS Security Assertion
Markup Language (SAML) V2.0, 2005). By agreeing upon a limited set of credential type
identifiers, Internet applications can be reasonably sure they are engaging in a secure identity
transaction with an identity provider.
Phishing
Web-based federated authentication usually involves a web browser redirection from an
Internet application to an identity provider for credential collection. This common pattern of
credential collection has a significant shortcoming that is difficult to overcome. The exploitation
occurs when the web browser is redirected an entity other than the identity provider intended to
carry out the authentication event. This may occur as a deliberate act of a malicious Internet
application or as the result of tampering with the communications between the Internet
application and the web browser.
Phishing is a complex topic and serious problem for Internet application and identity
providers wishing to engage in federated authentication. The OpenID Provider Authentication
Policy Extension (PAPE) specification offers modes for an Internet application to request the
identity provider use phishing resistant technologies. When directed to use phishing resistant
technologies, an identity provider will ensure a Secure Hyper Text Transfer Protocol (HTTPS)
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channel is used along with other techniques to reduce the risk of tampering with the
communications between the identity provider, Internet application, and user.

OpenID Authentication
OpenID is fundamentally based on the action of verifying ownership of a resource. This
resource is in the form of a publicly available Uniform Resource Locator (URL), specifically, an
HTTP or HTTPS-based URL (OpenID Authentication 2.0 - Final, 2007). For example, consider
Jane Doe who maintains the resource located at URL http://jane.doe.com. This URL is Jane’s
identifier and can be configured to facilitate OpenID authentication. The notion of an identifier
is one of the major paradigm shifts introduced by OpenID. Internet users have long been
comfortable with the notion of a username, and additionally the use of an email address as an
identifier. Expressing identity as an identifier proved to be an abrasive user experience which
led to the notion of an opaque identifier (Sun, Pospisil, Muslukhov, Dindar, Hawkey, &
Beznosov, 2011). The opaque identifier technique is mostly employed by larger identity
providers, Google for example, to avoid the need to initiate OpenID authentication with an
unfamiliar URL-based identifier. As a result, many Internet applications list, usually using
graphical icons, larger identity providers and users can initiate OpenID authentication by
selecting their respective identity provider. This technique is at times referred to as directed
identity, however, the OpenID specification titles the technique identifier selection (Norris,
2009). In Figure 4, a basic scenario using a user provided identifier will be presented to
highlight the fundamental concepts of OpenID.
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Figure 4 - Graphical Depiction of the OpenID Authentication Steps
1) Jane accesses an Internet application at URL http://foo.com.
2) Jane selects OpenID as her credential type and specifies http://jane.doe.com as her
OpenID identifier.
3) The Internet application discovers the identity provider for identifier http://jane.doe.com
and establishes a shared secret with the identity provider.
4) The Internet application redirects Jane to the identity provider discovered for her
identifier and is challenged for a login credential.
5) Jane returns to http://foo.com via redirect by the identity provider with an indication of
successful or failed authentication state.
A significant portion of the technical detail was omitted from these steps in attempt to
make the interactions between actors clear. The important parts to take note of are, the
Internet application allows Jane to specify her OpenID identifier and the Internet application
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accepts the authentication state from the identity provider and permits Jane access. This flow
demonstrates the truly open nature of OpenID in that an arbitrary identifier may be specified
to access the Internet application. In practice, this aspect of OpenID has not seen widespread
adoption and the permitted identity providers is typically a narrow list of prominent Internet
identity providers, for example, Figure 5.

Figure 5 - Example login component from http://sears.com featuring a constrained list of identity
providers with site specific icons.
The fact that most Internet applications employing OpenID have elected the practice of
listing specific identity providers is a signal that OpenID’s arbitrary identity provider notion may
not be suitable for widespread deployment. Additional investigation will be performed to
determine why this model is not appropriate for some Internet applications. While many aspects
of OpenID have been found desirable by Internet applications seeking alternative authentication
mechanisms, deficiencies in the technology have led to decommissioning of the technology by
major Internet applications (Scribd, 2009) (37signals, 2011).
This study aims to answer the following questions with regards to OpenID’s adoption and usage
by Internet applications:
1) What risks do Internet applications face by permitting arbitrary OpenID identity
providers to be used for authentication?
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2) What issues resulted in Internet applications adopting the practice of listing specific
identity providers for selection?
3) How does OpenID aid in the protection of users with respect to common credential theft
attacks, such as Phishing?
4) How does OpenID increase the security of authentication above what is provided by a
username and password credential?
History of OpenID
The earliest innovations leading to the creation of OpenID are those of Livejournal.com
founder, Brad Fitzpatrick. During the year 2004, Fitzpatrick began working with Live Journal, a
journaling Internet application popularized as a means for self-published content. Fitzpatrick
envisioned an identity system which eased the user experience of publishing comments on
journal entries on LiveJournal.com. Initially, the project was named YADIS, which expands to
“Yet Another Distributed Identity System”. The nature of this moniker suggests that the notion
of distributed identity was not new and Fitzpatrick was making another attempt to solve the
Internet authentication problem (Kim, 2005).
LiveJournal.com, being based on an openly distributed content management system
(CMS) code base, gained interest in OpenID by making the feature available in June 2005.
Shortly after, other Internet applications based on the same CMS became OpenID capable by
updating to the latest Live Journal code base (Fitzpatrick, 2005). Initially, the protocol was
promoted for low value transactions, specifically, leaving comments on journal entries. Shortly
after being made available, it became clear the protocol was robust enough for higher value
Internet application authentication. Other prominent Internet entities took notice of OpenID and
joined forces in evangelizing the technology, along with engineering support for the protocol in
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their Internet applications. OpenID continued to take the Internet by storm with the
establishment of start-up companies aiming to capitalize on value added services around OpenID
adoption and deployment.
Entrepreneurial Efforts
Like most new technologies, OpenID’s popularity inspired entrepreneurs to create new
businesses that strived to deliver value added features and services to users. Additionally, these
fledgling companies participate extensively in the drafting of specification documents and the
governance processes surrounding OpenID protocol definition. Two companies that made
significant contributions to the OpenID community are Janrain and Sxip. A closer look into the
contributions of each entity will highlight the unique role such actors play in new technology
development.
Janrain
Janrain was established in mid-2006 and initially focused on Internet application
integration componentry for OpenID. These components became widely adopted by Internet
applications and remain actively supported by either Janrain or teams of Open Source
developers. The development of integration componentry has been a successful strategy for
Janrain. Their portfolio of products and services is predominately oriented towards this sort of
offering and primarily targets user-centric identity technology, such as OpenID. An area of
focus of Janrain has been the enhancement of user experience of user-centric technologies.
Products such as Janrain Engage go to considerable lengths to provide an effective user interface
for interacting with specific identity providers along with a means for providing an arbitrary
OpenID identifier.
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Janrain continues to be successful with its ventures around user-centric identity
technologies and remains a respected member of many of the communities responsible for
technology specification. Their continued success is evident via the claim of 350,000 active
deployments of Janrain products and services along with the securing of additional capital
further grow the company (Janrain, 2011).
Sxip Identity Corporation
Sxip Identity Corporation was started by identity technologist Dick Hardt. Hardt gained
the attention of the identity community with his iconic Identity 2.0 presentation at the 2005
O'Reilly Open Source Convention (OSCON). Hardt tried to manifest the ideas expressed in the
Identity 2.0 presentation via Sxip’s products and services. One of Sxip’s most successful
products was Sxipper, a browser plug-in which eased the usage of user-centric identity
technologies. Unfortunately, Sxip and their products and services did not succeed as well as
needed to sustain the company. Sxip was dismantled via various corporate dealings with the
Sxipper product surviving as its own company for a few more years. Hardt remains an active
technologist in the identity community and recently facilitated a session titled Decline of UserCentric Identity at the 2011 Internet Identity Workshop (IIW). Hardt asserts that recent trends in
identity technology are straying from the user-centric architectures of protocols like OpenID.
Hardt’s influence on OpenID may be dwindling as he is no longer serving at the board level of
the OpenID Foundation.
OpenID Specification
As OpenID gained interest by technologists and Internet entities, the need for more
formal specification of protocol became necessary. The specification process is primarily
managed via the OpenID specification electronic mailing list. The initial finalized release of the
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OpenID specification is version 1.1 and was published in May 2006. This specification
formalized much of the OpenID protocol which was already deployed widely by Live Journal
and affiliated Internet applications. Specification work continued and culminated with the
publishing of the OpenID 2.0 specification in December 2007. The subsequent release of the
specification addressed various security issues, interoperability challenges, and generally
improved the protocol with additional features.
Somewhat tangential to the OpenID specification effort is the establishment of the
OpenID Foundation. This organization aims to evangelize the technology, sponsor
interoperability exercises, and serve as a central information repository for topics related to
OpenID. Of particular significance to the OpenID community, the foundation manages the
intellectual property and contribution agreements. In order for an individual or Internet entity to
participate in the OpenID specification process, an agreement must be submitted that surrenders
rights of contributions to the body of work. This exercise is vital to the health of a community
defined specification to ensure no person or entity can claim ownership of OpenID or related
technologies.
OpenID Identity Providers
The open nature of OpenID stems from the user’s provided identifier dictating which
identity provider will be used for authentication. Internet applications accepting OpenID may be
uncomfortable with a fully open mode of operation due to the risk involved in accepting users
from arbitrary identity providers. For example, identity provider implementations exist that do
not require a username or password and use an anonymous randomly generated identifier. Such
services compromise the integrity of the OpenID ecosystem as the Internet application cannot be
certain a user has been sufficiently challenged for credentials. While extensions to OpenID, such
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as OpenID Provider Authentication Policy Extension (PAPE), have been proposed, most Internet
applications have chosen a defensive posture and restrict OpenID authentication to large
trustworthy providers.
Provider Authentication Policy Extension (PAPE)
The OpenID community recognized the necessity for Internet applications to verify how
users authenticate at an identity provider. However, this capability is not part of the core
OpenID protocol specification. To address this deficiency, a subsequent specification was
drafted titled OpenID Provider Authentication Policy Extension (PAPE). This specification
defines a mechanism in which Internet applications may include additional information
conveying which authentication credential types are considered sufficient for authentication.
Unfortunately, not all OpenID identity providers offer PAPE capabilities and Internet
applications need to account for this if interoperating with arbitrary identity providers. The
PAPE capability is best suited for Internet applications that are constrained to a fixed set of
identity providers that offer PAPE such that OpenID protocol messaging can be enhanced with
enhanced authentication metadata.
Open Identity Exchange (OIX)
The Open Identity Exchange (OIX) is an organization which maintains a registry of
identity providers that have completed a rigorous certification processes. The OIX registry
contains a short list of identity providers who offer profiled OpenID features and extensions that
have been deemed as meeting a specific level of assurance (LOA). Based on the security
features of the identity provider, higher LOA profiles may be available to further protect the
identity transaction. The efforts of the OIX provide a valuable service to a user-centric identity
ecosystem that may at times seem completely unregulated. By engaging an identity provider

OPENID’S FIRST ACT

17

from the OIX registry, an Internet application can be reasonably certain the user-centric identity
technology in use has been implemented properly.
Advanced Authentication
While some identity providers intentionally try to degrade the security of the OpenID
ecosystem, many others strengthen the user’s security environment with the use of strong
authentication credentials. While username and password remain the predominant means for
authentication for Internet applications, some OpenID identity providers are aiming to improve
authentication security for users that select their identity provider. Clavid AG is one such
identity provider that allows users to use strong authentication mechanisms, such as One Time
Password (OTP), Client Certificate, and biometric technologies. Such identity providers help
realize the true potential of OpenID. In such a scenario, Internet applications could reduce the
level of effort expended implementing authentication technologies and simply use OpenID with
the necessary PAPE extensions to describe identity provider authentication strength. It is the
realization of this scenario that may revive OpenID in subsequent version specifications and
reduce the need for Internet applications to restrict permitted identity providers.
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Chapter 2 – Review of Literature and Research
The Laws of Identity
The Laws of Identity is a seminal work by technology thought leader Kim Cameron that
has influenced many of the identity protocols used on the Internet today. Cameron painstakingly
details the evolution of Internet identity and the problems resulting from often short sighted
solutions. The seven points outlined by Cameron have indeed become the laws of identity and
are often referenced in scholarly research publications when evaluating emerging identity
technologies. Cameron asserts that technologies not adhering to all seven laws will ultimately
fail as users disband usage when risks become evident. The specific laws that stand out as
essential qualities of viable identity are User Control and Consent and Human Integration. These
laws are of particular interest when considering OpenID and its short comings as an identity
technology.
Control and Consent
Control and Consent is the first law of identity as proposed by Cameron. At the core of
the Control and Consent law is the user of the identity system. The law lays the foundation of
user-centric principles being paramount to the success of an identity technology. While OpenID
goes to great lengths to abide by the Control and Consent law, it falls short with regards to
protecting the user from deception. The failure to natively address the risk of a user being
redirected to an entity other than the intended identity provider is a violation of Control and
Consent that ultimately leaves the user vulnerable to credential theft. Although the PAPE
extension to OpenID attempts to address this issue, being an optional enhancement to the
authentication process does not provide the user with consistent protection to consider the risk
fully mitigated.
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Human Integration
The Human Integration law addresses the importance of user experience in the success of
an identity technology. By far, much of the criticism OpenID receives is related to the user
experience making for an unpleasant and confusing authentication event. First, and foremost, the
use of a URL as a user identifier largely confuses users. This foreign expression of identity
leaves users unsure how to engage an Internet application. Although this usability deficiency has
been addressed with icons leading users to specific identity providers, this user interface
paradigm does not scale well. It Internet applications were to simply keep adding icons for
specific identity providers, users would be faced with far too many options to choose from,
resulting in a cumbersome process locating their identity provider.

A Billion Keys, but Few Locks: The Crisis of Web Single Sign-On
This proceeding from a prominent identity conference approaches the Internet federated
authentication (single sign-on) problem from several interesting directions. The authors assert
the single sign-on use case may be compelling from an academic standpoint, however, the value
propositions for users, identity providers, and target Internet applications are insufficient. The
assertion made about users is very interesting and makes several valid points about the current
environment in which users operate within to access Internet applications. Many users access
Internet applications using a desktop computer featuring an operating system with web browser
installed. Most modern web browsers feature some sort of embedded password vaulting
capability.
The authors make a valid point when suggesting that embedded password vaulting tools
are sufficient for most users. These tools recognize when a user is interacting with an Internet
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application that requires authentication and offers to cache the credential for subsequent visits.
While the security of these tools is questionable, users often find the capability’s convenience
outweighs the risks of storing passwords on their computer for later usage. Stored passwords
may be encrypted by some tools, however, popular embedded web browser password vaults
allow for the recovery of passwords with relative ease. Figure 6 provides a view of a popular
embedded web browser password vault that offers viewing of passwords in clear text.

Figure 6 - Example password management capability demonstrated via Firefox 5.x.
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Chapter 3 – Methodology

The qualitative research study has been performed via an extensive literature review of
existing publications relevant to the user-centric identity subject. Additionally, a survey was
conducted to assess the level of OpenID exposure amongst a carefully selected set of Internet
users. The results of these exercises will be analyzed to arrive at a conclusion that satisfactory
meets the objectives of the study stated in the abstract.
The participants of this study were provided an anonymous Internet-based survey
containing a variety of multiple-choice and rating scale questions. The questions are intended to
gauge the participants’ level of awareness and comfort using OpenID technology. The survey
will be administered using the SurveyMonkey online survey software & questionnaire tool. The
recipients of this survey will be derived from personal contacts of the author of this study, and
via solicitation of participants via public Internet forums. A minimum of 25 completed
questionnaires will be analyzed for this study.
Sample Questionnaire
1) Have you heard of OpenID technology?
a. Yes, very aware of its existence and purpose
b. Yes, heard of it but not really sure what it has to offer
c. Yes, but I thought it was called OpenID Connect
d. No
2) What is your level of comfort with OpenID technology?
a. Expert
b. Knowledgeable
c. Novice
d. Never heard of it or used it
3) Do you have an account with an OpenID provider?
a. Yes, with many OpenID providers
b. Yes, with only one provider
c. No
d. I don’t know
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4) How often do you use OpenID?
a. Frequently, used to access most Internet applications
b. Often, used to access a few Internet applications
c. Seldom, used to access one Internet application
d. Never
5) When creating a new account/or logging into an existing account, do you use features
such as “Login using Google”, or “Login using Facebook”.
a. Yes, always
b. Yes, sometimes
c. No
d. I don’t know
6) Are you aware that the “Login using Google” feature offered by some Internet
applications is currently implemented using OpenID?
a. Yes
b. I suspected that may be the case
c. No
7) Rate the overall user experience offered by OpenID technology using the scale below:
a. Satisfied
b. It gets the job done but could use improvement
c. Unusable
d. Never used it
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Chapter 4 –Results
Internet Presence
One of the ways the decline of OpenID manifests itself is the decreasing presence in
technology media and the marketing the technology is receiving. This decline is demonstrated
via the presentation a metric called search engine trending.
Search Engine Trending
A technique used to gauge the presence of a topic on the Internet is search engine
trending. This technique reveals how often a term is being searched for and visualizations are
rendered to show the overall progression of a trending topic on the Internet. The following
figure depicts the search term “OpenID” and its corresponding trend data for the Google Search
Engine.

Figure 7 - Search Engine Trending for term "OpenID" generated by
http://www.google.com/trends.
Figure 7 shows a distinct rise in search engine activity around February 2007 and another
significant spike in activity February 2008. The first spike in activity in February 2007 coincides
with the announcement made by America OnLine (AOL) which stated that the Internet entity
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supports OpenID. This support is limited to the identity provider role and applicable to all user
accounts within the AOL.com domain. The announcement boasted that effectively 63 million
OpenID-enabled accounts we’re ready to be used. This announcement generated significant
activity on the Internet in the form of both positive and negative feedback.
The second spike in activity seen in February 2008 coincides with the announcement of
several large corporate Internet entities joining the OpenID board. The notable list of
corporations, Google, Yahoo!, IBM, Microsoft, and VeriSign attracted significant attention
towards OpenID as is evident by Figure 7. The act of joining the board suggests that these
corporate entities were dedicated to seeing OpenID success and were going to advocate for its
adoption within their Internet applications.
Survey
The intention of the conducted survey is to measure casual internet users’ awareness of
OpenID identity technology. The participants of this survey are individuals with basic skills
using Internet applications, however, are not information technology experts or professionals.
The results of the survey indicate a general ignorance of OpenID identity technology and its
related use cases. These results suggest that attempts to market and evangelize OpenID to
Internet users were largely unsuccessful. Furthermore, like other identity technologies, OpenID
is best left as an infrastructure technology and further attempts to make casual users aware of its
usage only detracts from the user experience.
Awareness Questions
The first three questions of the survey aimed to gauge the awareness of OpenID
technology. 90% of respondents reported they either never heard of OpenID or were vaguely
aware of its existence and purpose. Furthermore, 90% of respondents stated that they do not
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have an account with an OpenID identity provider or were unsure if they had an account. These
results are a clear indication that OpenID technology has not made a major impact amongst
casual Internet application users. Considering that the majority of casual Internet users have
accounts with major Internet entities offering OpenID, such as Google, Yahoo!, and AOL, users
are seemingly unaware that OpenID authentication is available for their usage.
Usage Questions
The last four questions of the survey aimed to gauge usage information of OpenID
amongst casual Internet users. For example, question five inquired about usage of major Internet
entities offering OpenID, such as Google, when authenticating to other Internet applications.
Thirty percent of respondents acknowledged engaging in this use case. This response was quite
divergent from the other questions which asked outright about OpenID usage. The
overwhelming majority of respondents reported never using OpenID. This contradictory data
demonstrates that casual Internet users are simply unaware that they are using OpenID
technology to carry out some of their Internet application authentication events.
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Chapter 5 – Conclusions
A goal of this critical analysis is to reveal the shortcomings of OpenID that led to the
discontinuation of the technology by prominent Internet applications. Through the analysis of
peer reviewed documentation and data collection, it has been concluded that the combination of
awkward user experience, poor identity provider security, and lack of OpenID user awareness
lead to OpenID’s declining rate of adoption as a standard for Internet single-sign-on. As the
OpenID Foundation currently works to deliver a new version of the protocol, these issues will
hopefully be addressed and the user-centric identity technology will be reintroduced to Internet
users and applications with more compelling features.

Internet Presence
As demonstrated by the Figure 7 search engine trending data, OpenID has seen a steady
decline in Internet search activity, specifically via the Google Search Engine. While this trend
may continue, there is a distinct chance that trending data may reverse as activity within the
OpenID community increases around the specification of the next version of the protocol. While
this reversal of activity may suggest a renewed interest in OpenID’s First Act, instead it will
reflect interest in the workings of the OpenID Foundation towards subsequent protocol
specification release.

User Awareness
The survey conducted yielded results suggesting casual Internet users are largely unaware
of OpenID as a technology, although they may be using it to carry out authentication events with
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Internet applications. This phenomenon suggests that casual Internet users need not be aware of
the underlying authentication protocols employed by Internet applications.
OpenID’s First Act involved considerable marketing targeted at users. User were
encouraged to learn about the technology and then steered towards identity providers and
Internet applications which employed the technology so they could begin using it. It can be
concluded that this marketing approach was largely ineffective. Most Internet application users
are generally uninterested in the technologies being used to facilitate authentication and are more
concerned with a pleasant user experience. If an identity technology is trying to draw attention
to it simply to gain awareness, the user is being distracted from their primary goal of Internet
application usage. Users want functional Internet applications and have little tolerance for
unnecessary steps in Internet application usage (Sun, Pospisil, Muslukhov, Dindar, Hawkey, &
Beznosov, 2011).

Recent Deployments
Despite what seems like a decline in the adoption and usage of OpenID, a significant new
deployment has recently been publicized by a major Internet entity. PayPal, a leading
ecommerce transaction facilitator, announced PayPal Access, which is based on OpenID 2.0.
This deployment suggests that OpenID may remain viable for the identifier selection scenario in
which authentication is constrained to a single or finite list of identity providers. To properly
measure the success of this specific deployment, further research may be conducted to determine
how many Internet applications permit the PayPal Access technology to be used as an
authentication option. This specific deployment addresses the assertion that no value
propositions exist to drive Internet application and user adoption of user-centric identity
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technologies. PayPal, being a financial transaction facilitator, introduces a strong motivator by
easing the authentication process at Internet applications and readying users to complete an
ecommerce transaction without secondary authentication.

Further Research
OpenID’s First Act concluded with mixed views of the overall protocol’s success among
identity technologists. While several large prominent deployments of OpenID remain on the
Internet today, chances are these deployments will migrate to the next version of OpenID as it
becomes available. Initial specification drafts reveal the next version of OpenID being a
complete divergence from the architectural underpinnings of OpenID’s First Act. Will major
deployments of OpenID remain on the current architecture as it seems to meet their needs at the
moment? Revisiting this topic after the next version of OpenID specification is released would
further aid in determining if OpenID’s First Act was a success, failure, or neither. It just may be
that OpenID’s First Act was a necessary evolutionary step along the lifecycle of user-centric
identity protocol development.
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